The global energy landscape has always been a high-stakes arena, but rarely has it been so explicitly tied to the raw calculus of war and power as it is today. The recent maneuvering between Donald Trump, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and Vladimir Putin over critical minerals and hydrocarbons is not merely a matter of economic negotiation; it is an unvarnished power struggle where sovereignty, law, and geopolitics collide.
Zelenskyy walked into the Oval Office expecting to discuss military aid, but Trump had a different agenda. Instead of reaffirming unwavering American support for Ukraine’s fight for survival, Trump demanded half of Ukraine’s resource wealth—its minerals, oil, gas, and even ports—in exchange for continued U.S. military assistance. Let that sink in. This was not a defense agreement; it was a demand for economic tribute. Kyiv’s hesitation is understandable. After all, a nation fighting for its existence cannot afford to sign away its future under duress.
Ukraine’s wealth is no small matter. It holds Europe’s largest titanium reserves, a lithium supply estimated at 500,000 tons, and a trove of rare earth elements, essential for everything from fighter jets to electric vehicle batteries. Before the war, Ukraine was a major supplier of steel, neon gas, and industrial metals to Europe. In short, Ukraine’s resources are not just valuable; they are strategically indispensable. But the reality is clear: war has transformed them into bargaining chips, a currency of survival.
When Zelenskyy balked at the terms, Trump reportedly berated him, calling his resistance “disrespectful” and warning that rejecting the deal was “gambling with the lives of millions.” This was more than just tough negotiation; it was an ultimatum. The premise was simple—give America your resources, or risk being left to fend for yourself against Russia. The proposal raises serious international legal questions. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, agreements signed under coercion are void. The UN Charter and General Assembly Resolution 1803 enshrine permanent sovereignty over natural resources, making it clear that Ukraine cannot be forced into selling its national assets as the price of continued existence.
The legal implications extend far beyond Ukraine’s borders. If such a deal were to go through, it would set a dangerous precedent: a world where military assistance is no longer grounded in alliances or security interests, but in raw economic extortion. The transaction would resemble a form of modern resource colonialism, violating fundamental principles of international law. It would blur the line between military aid and outright plunder.
Sensing an opening, Putin wasted no time in making his own offer. If Washington wanted minerals and hydrocarbons, why bother with a war-torn Ukraine when Russia—rich in resources and conveniently unbothered by legalities—could provide them instead? His pitch: access to Russia’s vast rare earth deposits, 2 million tons of aluminum per year, and joint projects in Siberian energy and metals, all in exchange for lifting U.S. sanctions. He even went a step further—offering U.S. firms access to minerals in Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory. This is where it becomes even more insidious.
Putin was essentially offering stolen goods to the United States. Under international law, particularly the Hague Regulations of 1907 (Article 55) and Geneva Convention IV, an occupying power cannot permanently exploit or sell the resources of an occupied territory. What Russia has done—and is openly proposing to expand—is economic pillage, a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Any U.S. entity that so much as touches these resources risks being complicit in trafficking stolen property.
The European Union, meanwhile, is caught in the middle of this geopolitical firestorm, frantically shoring up its energy security. Europe learned its lesson the hard way in 2022 when Russia turned off the gas taps, weaponizing energy supply. Since then, the EU has aggressively diversified away from Russian hydrocarbons, cutting its reliance on Moscow’s gas from 40% to 15% within two years. New LNG terminals have come online, deals with the U.S., Qatar, and Algeria have been inked, and pipeline projects from Norway and Azerbaijan have been revived. The EU has also doubled down on legal barriers, banning all imports from Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, ensuring that no minerals or hydrocarbons from Crimea, Donetsk, or Luhansk find their way into European markets.
The stakes could not be higher. If the U.S. were to strike a minerals-for-aid deal with Ukraine, would it tacitly accept Russian control over the 20% of Ukraine’s resources currently under occupation? Would it encourage future wars of conquest by signaling that resources extracted under occupation can eventually become legal trade? These are not just political questions—they are fundamental to the laws of war and peace.
Energy security is no longer just about supply chains and trade agreements—it is about power. The old world of oil politics has now expanded into “metal politics”, where control over lithium, titanium, and rare earth elements can decide the balance of global dominance. For the oil and gas sector, and the legal profession advising it, this is a new and volatile frontier. Companies must navigate an intricate web of sanctions law, treaty law, and the laws of occupation, all while recognizing that one wrong move could mean massive penalties or complicity in war crimes. Due diligence has never been more critical.
As this geopolitical chess match unfolds, one thing is clear: natural resources are now as much about legal rights and strategic security as they are about economics. The question remains—will the world uphold the rule of law, or will it descend into a ruthless resource scramble where might makes right? The coming months will provide an answer, shaping the global legal and business landscape for years to come. In the meantime, those of us advising in the energy sector must remain watchful. The fate of nations—and the principles of international law—are now being decided in boardrooms just as much as on the battlefield.
Some Legal Q & A on the urgency, economic stakes, and geopolitical intrigue of the mineral-driven power plays between the U.S., Ukraine, Russia, and the EU.
1. What is the core legal issue behind Trump’s demand for a stake in Ukraine’s minerals in exchange for military aid?
At its essence, this is a question of sovereignty and coercion. International law, particularly the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (UNGA Res. 1803), prohibits forcing a state to hand over its national wealth under duress. If Ukraine were to agree, the deal could be challenged as invalid under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which nullifies agreements signed under coercion.
2. How does the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties apply to Trump’s mineral-for-aid proposal?
Article 52 of the VCLT states that a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force. If Ukraine is given the choice between signing over mineral rights or losing military aid essential to its survival, one could argue that this deal is being made under duress, which would undermine its legitimacy.
3. Could Trump legally enforce such a minerals agreement in U.S. courts?
Highly doubtful. If Ukraine’s government later refused to honour the deal, any attempt to enforce it could be struck down under international contract principles of “good faith” and “coercion.” Moreover, U.S. courts might be reluctant to enforce an agreement that contradicts established treaty law and human rights norms.
4. Is there historical precedent for a country offering its resources in exchange for military support?
Yes, but always under murky legal conditions. Consider post-WWII U.S. economic arrangements in the Middle East—where oil concessions were often granted in exchange for security guarantees—but those were negotiated under vastly different circumstances, with no immediate existential threat to the state.
5. How does Ukraine’s constitutional framework limit its ability to sign away resource revenues?
Under Article 13 of Ukraine’s Constitution, the natural resources of Ukraine are the property of the Ukrainian people, not the government alone. Any arrangement ceding long-term control of such assets might require parliamentary approval or even a referendum, which could be politically impossible.
6. Does international humanitarian law prohibit Russia from exploiting Ukraine’s resources in occupied territories?
Absolutely. The Hague Regulations (1907, Article 55) and the Geneva Convention IV (1949) state that an occupying power may not permanently exploit or transfer the resources of occupied land. Russia’s ongoing mineral and hydrocarbon extraction in occupied Ukraine is considered plunder and, under Article 8(2)(b)(xvi) of the Rome Statute, constitutes a war crime.
7. Could Putin legally sell minerals from occupied Ukrainian territories to the U.S.?
No. Under international law, these resources belong to Ukraine, and any company purchasing them would be complicit in the unlawful appropriation of stolen assets—potentially violating U.S. and EU sanctions, as well as prohibitions on trading pillaged goods under the Rome Statute.
8. Would U.S. sanctions allow Trump to accept Putin’s offer of Russian minerals?
Not without a legal battle. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and numerous executive orders prohibit trade in Russian-origin raw materials unless explicitly waived by Congress or the President. Reversing these sanctions would require overcoming immense political and legal hurdles.
9. Could European companies legally purchase minerals extracted from Russian-occupied Ukraine?
No. The EU’s sanctions regime explicitly bans imports from Crimea and other occupied regions. Any European entity caught importing such goods risks severe financial penalties, asset seizures, and reputational damage.
10. What precedent does this case set for other territorial conflicts?
A dangerous one. If a precedent is set where an aggressor state can profit from plundering occupied lands without consequence, it undermines the international legal order and could incentivize resource wars in places like Taiwan, the South China Sea, or disputed Arctic territories.
11. Could the U.S. legally impose secondary sanctions on firms dealing in Russian-occupied Ukrainian minerals?
Yes. The U.S. already applies secondary sanctions on Iran and could expand similar penalties to foreign companies engaging in resource transactions with Russia’s occupation regime.
12. If a U.S. company accepted Putin’s offer, could they be prosecuted under U.S. law?
Possibly. Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and sanctions laws, a U.S. entity knowingly purchasing minerals sourced from stolen Ukrainian land might be subject to criminal liability, fines, and forfeiture of assets.
13. Could Ukraine sue Russia for illegal resource exploitation in an international tribunal?
Yes. Ukraine could bring a case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under state responsibility principles, as well as seek damages through investor-state arbitration if foreign firms are impacted.
14. How does the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) factor into this situation?
Ukraine is a signatory to the ECT, which protects foreign investors in its energy sector. If the U.S. or EU were to invest in Ukrainian mining or energy projects, Russia’s occupation and expropriation of those assets could lead to massive compensation claims against Moscow.
15. Could the ICC prosecute Russian officials for resource plunder?
Yes. Under the Rome Statute, Article 8, pillaging natural resources is a war crime. Russian officials authorizing these activities could face international prosecution.
16. If Ukraine refused to comply with a signed mineral agreement under duress, could the U.S. sue for breach of contract?
Legally, coerced contracts are unenforceable. Under international contract law, if Ukraine can demonstrate that the agreement was signed under duress (i.e., forced military dependence), it could argue that the deal is void ab initio (invalid from the start). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) Article 52 provides that treaties procured by coercion are null and void.
17. What legal protections does Ukraine have to prevent forced resource concessions?
The UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (1962) on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources explicitly states that nations have an inalienable right to control their own resources. Any deal that appears to strip a country of that sovereignty under duress could be challenged under international law.
18. Could the United Nations intervene to stop an illegal minerals agreement?
Theoretically, yes, but practically, no. The UN Security Council could declare such an agreement illegitimate, but given Russia’s veto power, that’s unlikely. However, the UN General Assembly could pass a resolution condemning the deal, adding diplomatic pressure.
19. What is the potential impact of this case on the doctrine of “economic coercion” in international law?
If Ukraine signs under duress, it could set a dangerous precedent that undermines the doctrine of economic sovereignty, making it easier for powerful nations to extort resource deals from weaker states. This would violate the spirit of the UN Charter and the WTO framework, which prohibit economic coercion in international relations.
20. If Trump were to accept Putin’s mineral offer, would that undermine U.S. sanctions on Russia?
Absolutely. Accepting Russian-origin minerals—especially from occupied Ukrainian territory—would be a de facto recognition of Russian control, directly violating U.S. and EU sanctions regimes. This would also create a diplomatic firestorm among U.S. allies.
21. Could the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) hear a case on Ukraine’s resource sovereignty?
Possibly. If Ukrainian citizens or businesses suffer losses due to a coerced minerals-for-aid deal, they could bring a case before the ECHR under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which protects property rights from unlawful state interference.
22. Would a Trump-Putin mineral deal violate WTO trade rules?
Potentially. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prohibits unfair trade restrictions. If Russia gave the U.S. privileged access to minerals while continuing to weaponize resources against the EU, the EU could challenge the deal at the WTO.
23. Could Ukraine impose retroactive nullification of an unfair mineral deal?
Yes. Under Ukrainian constitutional law, any government that enters into an unfair, sovereignty-eroding contract could have it annulled through domestic legal processes. Ukraine’s Parliament could pass a law nullifying an illegitimate deal, citing duress and coercion.
24. What legal risks would U.S. companies face if they entered into a resource agreement with Russia?
Any U.S. entity investing in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory would be exposed to civil and criminal liability under U.S. sanctions laws. Secondary sanctions could also apply, meaning even non-U.S. firms trading with them could be blacklisted.
25. Could Ukraine seek war reparations for stolen minerals?
Yes. Ukraine could bring a war reparations claim against Russia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under state responsibility principles. If successful, it could demand compensation for all resources extracted illegally from occupied territory.
26. Does the U.S. have the legal authority to seize Russian mineral assets as compensation for Ukraine?
Possibly. Under U.S. asset forfeiture laws, the U.S. could confiscate Russian-owned resources or financial assets and allocate them to Ukraine as reparations. Canada has already passed legislation enabling such asset seizures.
27. Would a Trump-Putin mineral trade violate the Magnitsky Act?
Likely. The Global Magnitsky Act allows the U.S. to sanction individuals and entities engaged in corruption or human rights abuses. Facilitating the sale of minerals plundered from Ukraine’s occupied regions could fall under this statute.
28. Could Ukraine use arbitration to block an unfair minerals deal?
Yes. If Ukraine signs an investment agreement with the U.S. under unfair conditions, it could bring an investor-state dispute under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) or the ICSID arbitration system to challenge the terms.
29. Can the U.S. legally withhold military aid if Ukraine refuses to sign over its minerals?
Legally? Yes. Ethically? No. The U.S. Congress controls foreign aid appropriations, and military assistance is always conditional. However, using it as leverage to extract mineral wealth blurs the line between diplomacy and extortion.
30. What are the legal implications if European companies exploit Ukraine’s minerals post-war?
If done legally, European investment in Ukraine’s mining sector would be protected under bilateral investment treaties (BITs). However, if post-war Ukraine reneges on deals signed under duress, investors could face expropriation disputes.
31. Could NATO invoke Article 5 if Russia retaliates for mineral trade restrictions?
If Russia were to militarily retaliate against Ukraine for refusing a mineral deal, NATO could invoke Article 5 (collective defense), assuming Ukraine were a member. Currently, Ukraine isn’t in NATO, but continued Russian aggression could strengthen its case for membership.
32. Could a post-war Ukrainian government cancel all energy and mineral contracts signed during the war?
Possibly. If deemed unfair or exploitative, a post-war Ukrainian government could invoke force majeure or coercion claims to nullify wartime resource agreements.
33. What legal arguments could Russia use to justify its mineral plunder?
Russia might claim de facto sovereignty over occupied lands, citing “administration of resources” under the Hague Regulations of 1907. However, this would be legally unsustainable under the UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions.
34. Could Russia be sued in U.S. courts for resource theft?
Yes, but enforcement is tricky. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), exceptions exist for expropriated property. If a U.S. company suffered losses due to Russia’s actions, it could sue Moscow in U.S. courts.
35. How does the EU’s ban on Russian commodities affect global markets?
The EU’s sanctions have significantly reshaped energy and mineral markets, forcing diversification away from Russia, increasing reliance on LNG, renewables, and non-Russian rare earth sources.
36. Could Ukraine leverage China to counterbalance U.S. and Russian pressure?
China is heavily dependent on critical minerals but remains diplomatically cautious on Ukraine. If Kyiv were to invite Chinese investment into its mining sector, it could shift geopolitical dynamics significantly.
37. Could the International Criminal Court prosecute executives of companies dealing in stolen Ukrainian minerals?
Possibly. If corporate leaders knowingly profit from Russian-occupied resource extraction, they could be charged under international criminal law for complicity in pillage.
38. How do these deals impact the long-term stability of the global energy market?
They introduce massive uncertainty, making investors wary of long-term projects in conflict zones, while also accelerating the Western shift away from resource dependencies on autocratic regimes.
39. Could Ukraine’s resources become a post-war bargaining chip in a peace deal?
Almost certainly. Expect negotiations to involve control over key mineral regions and whether Ukraine retains full sovereignty over its resource wealth.
41. If Ukraine is forced into an unfair minerals deal, could it later claim reparations from the U.S.?
Legally, it would be unprecedented, but not impossible. If Ukraine can prove that it was pressured into a predatory agreement violating international norms, it could seek compensation through diplomatic channels or international arbitration, especially if the U.S. benefited unjustly from coerced concessions.
42. Would a Trump-Putin resource deal violate the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act?
Yes, and in multiple ways. The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) prohibits U.S. aid to any government engaged in human rights violations. If Ukraine were forced into an unfair deal, or if the U.S. legitimized Russian looting of Ukrainian minerals, it could violate FAA provisions.
43. Could Ukraine’s Parliament block an unfair resource deal post-war?
Absolutely. Any contract that undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty could be nullified by legislative action. Future governments could argue that any such agreement was unconstitutional or incompatible with Ukraine’s national interests.
44. Could NATO or the EU impose additional sanctions on Russian minerals if the U.S. made a deal?
Yes, and it would likely happen immediately. If the U.S. were to resume trade in Russian resources, NATO and the EU could retaliate with secondary sanctions, new trade restrictions, or increased economic isolation of U.S. firms engaged in Russian transactions.
45. What impact would accepting Russian minerals have on U.S.-EU relations?
It would shatter transatlantic unity. The EU has spent years decoupling from Russian energy, and if the U.S. were to reverse course and accept Russian commodities, it could lead to severe diplomatic rifts and economic consequences.
46. Could Ukraine nationalize its mineral resources to prevent coercive deals?
Yes, and this would be a strategic move. Declaring key resources “strategic national assets” under Ukrainian law would allow the government to permanently restrict foreign ownership and prevent forced agreements.
47. How could the International Energy Agency (IEA) respond to this situation?
The IEA could advocate for energy security reforms that prevent authoritarian regimes from using mineral and energy access as economic weapons, reinforcing Western investment in diversified supply chains.
48. Could the Trump-Zelenskyy mineral standoff impact U.S. defense contracts?
Definitely. U.S. defense contractors rely on rare earth elements, many of which come from China and unstable regions. If Ukraine withholds access or demands new terms, it could disrupt military supply chains.
49. Would a peace deal that includes mineral concessions be legally enforceable?
It depends on the conditions. If the deal preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty and is ratified without coercion, it may be legally binding. However, if it’s perceived as unjust or forced, future Ukrainian governments could challenge it in domestic and international courts.
50. What precedent does this set for future wars and resource conflicts?
A dangerous one. If aggressors see that resources can be leveraged for diplomatic recognition or economic gain, it may encourage future resource-based conflicts. The world’s next war might not be over land—but over lithium, oil, and rare earths.
At Josh and Mak International, we approach the law with the gravitas it deserves, understanding that every legal matter carries profound personal and ethical weight. Guided by principles of justice, fairness, and unwavering integrity, we see our role as more than advocates—we are stewards of our clients’ rights and aspirations. Our work is shaped by a commitment to excellence, meticulous attention to detail, and a deep respect for the dignity inherent in every legal challenge. With a steadfast focus on achieving equitable outcomes, we bring clarity to complexity and champion your cause with the insight and care it merits. Let us stand as your devoted partners in the pursuit of justice and peace.
Contact us at [email protected] for Legal Consultation.
https://joshandmakinternational.com/
