S. 12-A (1) & S. 3(1)—Exemption from excise duty–Effect of Notification No. SRO. 555 (1)/79 dated 28th June 1979—Earlier Notification No. SRO 810 (1)/78 dated 29th dune 1978 though superseded but exemption from duty would continue on yarn produced and manufactured earlier than midnight between 27th and 28th June 1979—Fact that these goods were still lying in premises of Mills or in an outside godown would not militate against petitioner so long as they were produced and manufactured before stated date–Duty is only at stage of production and manufacture of goods and not dependent on their subsequent disposal—Action seeking recovery of duty in instant case held, illegal and without lawful authority. PLJ 1980 Lahore 398
S. 12A (1) read with Ss. (2)&0 ( j) and 3Three notifications qua levy of excise duty on certain articles Liability to tax before issuance of third notification to .be regulated by second notification which was operative at the time of manufacture. P L J 1981 Supreme Court 469
S. 3 (4) read with (Aerated water) Rules, 1990–Excise duty–Recovery of–Contention that when writ petition was filed before High Court and decision was given thereon, proviso to rule 7 was not in existence as old rule 7 was first substituted by a new rule 7 which was further amended and a new rule 7-A was added, and therefore, decision given by High Court regarding validity of proviso to rule 7 is of no consequence–Supreme Court is not inclined to go into this question as all parties proceeded before High Court on an assumption that proviso to rule 7 was in existence–This point was not agitated before High Court and consequently High Court did not record any finding in this regard–Held: Supreme Court is not inclined to go into this question–Appeal dismissed. PLJ 1996 SC 636
S. 3 (4) read with (Aerated water) Rules, 1990–Excise duty–Recovery of–Contention that respondents being a member of Association with whose consent rules were framed, they should not be allowed to challenge validity of Rules–Respondent claimed in their writ petition that scheme of taxation framed by appellants left no option for them but to opt for payment of excise duty under Rules–Respondent challenged validity of Proviso to rule 7 on ground that it infringed their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25 of Constitution–Held: Such right of citizens cannot be defeated on ground of waiver. PLJ 1996 SC 636
S. 3(4) & 37 read with (Aerated water) Rules, 1990–Excise duty–Recovery of–Criteria for levy of excise duty on production under section 3 (4) of Act has reference only to production capacity of plant, machinery, undertaking, establishment or installation and it bears no nexus with actual production of goods by manufacturers–Creation of sub-class out of a well defined and intelligible classification of manufacturers of foreign brand of aerated water, on basis of payment of excise duty by them on actual production of goods in proceeding year and determining their tax liability on that basis, hears no nexus to object of classification envisaged by section 3(4) of the Act and thus amounted to discrimination within a well defined category of manufacturers–Rules having been framed by appellants under section 3(4) of the Act. the proviso to rule 7. was enacted beyond mandate of that Section–Held: It was invalid. PLJ 1996 SC 636
S. 4 (1)–Whether transportation and octroi charges were leviable on cement in computing whole sale cash price under section 4 (1) for assessment of Excise duty and Sales Tax–Question of–Amendment made in Section 4 (1) dearly signify an intention on part of legislature to include element of post-manufacture charges for purpose of computation of whole sale cash price, barring only what has been expressly provided by legislature–Notwithstanding the fact that by some understanding between manufacturer of articles and their retail trader octroi or transportation or any other such charges are to be borne by latter–Therefore, even if contention raised on behalf of respondent that octroi or transportation charges were not borne by it but same were borne by its stockists is believed, same would be of little consequence–Held, Octroi and transportation charges could be included while determining whole sale cash price of cement manufactured by respondent since same was permissible under section 4 (1) of Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944–Appeal accepted. PLJ 1996 SC 584
S. 4(2)–Manufacture of cigarettes–Excise duty on–Levy of–Whether “K-2 Plain” and “K-2 Economy” are of same brand/variety for chargeability–Question of–According to Section 4(2) retail price on which duty is chargeable, is fixed by manufacturer as price at which a particular brand or variety of goods is sold to consumers–When for same brand or variety, manufacturer has fixed different prices, duty is leviable on highest of such prices–There is no doubt that “K-2 Plain” and “K-2 Economy” carry different retail prices and price of former being comparatively higher, has been applied by Department for chargeability of duty for both of them–Word “variety” implies a separate set of goods and there may he more than one variety of same brand–“K-2 Plain” and “K-2 Economy” are two different varieties of brand “K-2”–Held: It is difficult to agree with reasoning that “K-2 Plain” and “K-2 Economy” are same brand/variety for purposes of chargeability–Held further: Basis on which departmental authorities came to conclusion that respondent was guilty of evasion of duty, cannot be sustained–Appeal dismissed
