September 2026 Update: The Hypothetical Hormuz Crisis Has Become Real
When this analysis was first published in March 2026, the central legal question was what would happen if escalating conflict around the Strait of Hormuz materially interfered with one of the most important maritime corridors in the world.
Six months later, that question is no longer hypothetical.
The Strait has experienced prolonged disruption, attacks upon international shipping, severe reductions in energy flows, extraordinary increases in maritime risk, rerouting of cargoes, naval operations, insurance complications and increasingly novel attempts by states and commercial actors to determine which vessels may safely or lawfully pass.
The result is precisely the type of phenomenon international commercial lawyers have long understood but markets sometimes underestimate: a geopolitical crisis does not remain a geopolitical crisis for very long. It travels down the contractual chain.
The missile strike becomes an insurance claim. The blockade becomes a charterparty dispute. The unsafe waterway becomes a deviation argument. The delayed LNG cargo becomes a force majeure notice. The naval restriction becomes a sanctions problem. The additional war premium becomes an argument between owner and charterer about who must pay.
And eventually, many of those arguments arrive not before a court overlooking the Persian Gulf, but before arbitrators and commercial judges thousands of miles away.
The scale of the disruption is now measurable
The energy figures alone illustrate the transformation.
According to the United States Energy Information Administration, combined crude oil and petroleum-liquid flows through the Strait averaged approximately 21.6 million barrels per day during the fourth quarter of 2025. During the second quarter of 2026, that figure had collapsed to approximately 4.9 million barrels per day. LNG movements fell even more dramatically, from approximately 10.5 billion cubic feet per day to only 0.8 billion cubic feet per day over the same comparison period.
The human consequences have been equally grave. On 28 August 2026, the International Maritime Organization reported that at least 70 attacks against international shipping had been verified during the six months following the commencement of the conflict, with 19 seafarers killed and thousands of crew members continuing to work amid heightened uncertainty and danger.
The crisis has not followed a simple binary pattern in which the Strait is either “open” or “closed”. Rather, navigation has fluctuated according to military conditions, vessel identity, insurance availability, naval protection, sanctions exposure and individual masters’ assessments of risk.
That distinction is legally important.
On 9 September, preliminary shipping data reported by Reuters showed only six commodity vessels traversing Hormuz on the preceding day, compared with a ten-day average of approximately twelve. Five were inbound and only one outbound. The data may understate actual movement because vessels sometimes deactivate their Automatic Identification System transponders while navigating dangerous waters.
This is therefore no ordinary commercial delay. It is an environment in which the legal ability to order a vessel through the Strait may diverge considerably from its physical ability, insurability and operational willingness to proceed.
September has brought a particularly dangerous escalation
The beginning of September has made the legal position still more volatile.
Iran has announced an intention to establish what it describes as an “exclusion zone” connected with vessels seeking to pass through the Strait. The proposal follows renewed military confrontation, including American strikes against Iranian oil tankers and Iranian attacks upon vessels and American interests in the region.
Iran has separately expanded a blacklist of vessels said to be prohibited from navigating the Strait, with Reuters reporting on 2 September that the number listed had risen to 56 and included crude, LNG, LPG and refined-product carriers.
Meanwhile, commercial operators have begun employing highly unusual physical workarounds. Qatari and UAE LNG cargoes have been transferred ship-to-ship outside the Strait so that different vessels can complete onward delivery. Such operations are exceptional in the LNG industry and vividly demonstrate the extent to which commercial practice is being reconstructed around the security problem.
Oil markets have reacted accordingly. By 9 September, Brent crude was again approaching US$100 per barrel, with the market carrying a substantial geopolitical and supply-risk premium.
This is precisely why the legal analysis cannot end with the question, “Is Hormuz technically open?”
For contractual purposes, the more important questions are whether the route is safe, whether the voyage remains commercially and legally performable, whether suitable insurance remains obtainable, whether the master can reasonably refuse orders, whether the charterer must nominate an alternative voyage, whether sanctions prevent particular dealings and, ultimately, which party has contractually assumed the resulting cost.
International Law: An Important Qualification About UNCLOS
The original version of this article should also be refined on one important point.
Articles 38 and 44 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea establish the regime of transit passage through straits used for international navigation. Article 38 provides that ships and aircraft enjoy a right of transit passage which shall not be impeded, while Article 44 provides that states bordering such straits shall not hamper transit passage and that there shall be no suspension of it.
The IMO Council expressly reaffirmed those principles in July 2026, stating that transit passage through straits used for international navigation should not be threatened, impeded, denied, hampered, impaired or suspended.
There is, however, an important legal wrinkle which deserves acknowledgement.
Oman is a party to UNCLOS. Iran signed UNCLOS on 10 December 1982 but has never ratified it. The United Nations Treaty Collection accordingly records Iran’s signature without a subsequent ratification date.
Iran’s own declaration upon signature was also unusually significant. It stated that certain UNCLOS provisions were products of negotiated compromise and did not necessarily constitute codification of pre-existing customary international law.
It would therefore be too simplistic to write that Iran is contractually bound by UNCLOS in precisely the same manner as a state which has ratified it.
The international-law controversy consequently involves several overlapping bodies of law: UNCLOS obligations binding upon parties, arguments concerning customary international law, the general principle of freedom of navigation, the United Nations Charter, the law governing the use of force, the law of naval warfare and the rules protecting civilian commercial shipping during armed conflict.
The legal conclusion is not that the Strait has somehow become a jurisprudential vacuum. Quite the opposite. It has become a location in which multiple regimes of international law collide.
The Most Important Development for Businesses: Hormuz Has Become a Contract Interpretation Crisis
Perhaps the most commercially significant development since our original article is that the shipping industry’s standard contractual architecture is now being tested against precisely the circumstances for which it was designed.
BIMCO itself acknowledged in August that months of Gulf disruption had exposed owners and charterers to issues including refusal of orders, safe-port and safe-route obligations, alternative employment, force majeure, deviation, delay, off-hire, redelivery and responsibility for additional war-risk premiums. BIMCO is now examining whether existing contractual frameworks contain gaps exposed by the crisis.
That is rather remarkable.
The international organisation responsible for many of the clauses used throughout global shipping is effectively studying the Hormuz crisis as a live stress test of modern maritime contracting.
Force majeure does not mean “there is a war, therefore I do not have to perform”
This is perhaps the most dangerous misconception for commercial parties.
Under English law, force majeure is principally a creature of contract rather than a free-standing doctrine automatically excusing performance whenever extraordinary circumstances arise.
The precise clause therefore matters.
A party invoking force majeure will ordinarily need to demonstrate that the event falls within the contractual definition; that it materially caused the inability or impediment relied upon; that contractual notice requirements were satisfied; and that any contractual duty to mitigate or employ reasonable alternatives has been addressed.
There is consequently an enormous difference between a contract referring merely to “war” and one which expressly includes blockade, closure of waterways, sanctions, governmental restrictions, hostile acts, mines, terrorism, denial of insurance or interruption of transportation.
The drafting now determines where millions of dollars of losses ultimately sit.
VOYWAR and CONWARTIME have suddenly become very expensive clauses
BIMCO’s 2025 editions of VOYWAR and CONWARTIME are particularly important.
CONWARTIME 2025 treats matters including war, hostilities, mines, capture, seizure, terrorism and blockades as potential war risks. Crucially, where the master or owner reasonably considers that a vessel, cargo or crew may be exposed to such danger, the vessel need not necessarily proceed through the affected area. The clause also expressly addresses additional war-risk insurance costs.
VOYWAR 2025 contains corresponding mechanisms for voyage charters. Depending upon the circumstances, owners may request nomination of another safe port, avoid proceeding through a dangerous area, adopt an alternative route or, in certain circumstances, cancel. The modern clause also contains mechanisms dealing with adjustment of freight where alternative routing changes the economics of performance.
Hormuz therefore demonstrates why a shipping contract cannot intelligently be reviewed by looking at the force majeure clause alone.
War-risk provisions, safe-port warranties, deviation rights, bills of lading, off-hire clauses, insurance provisions, trading limits, sanctions clauses and bespoke amendments must be read together.
One badly drafted sentence can transfer an astonishing quantity of geopolitical risk from one contracting party to another.
The Master’s Decision Is Becoming Legally Central
There is another dimension which deserves far greater emphasis than it received in the original article: the human and professional responsibility resting upon the master and vessel operator.
On 9 June, the IMO Secretary-General warned that there was “no safe passage” through Hormuz under the prevailing circumstances and emphasised that the master and company retain ultimate responsibility for voyage planning and realistic risk assessment. He further stressed that commercial considerations cannot justify exposing seafarers to known and significant danger.
This can have enormous contractual consequences.
A charterer’s instruction may be commercially understandable and nevertheless incapable of compelling a master to undertake an objectively dangerous transit. Conversely, an owner cannot necessarily invoke a vague perception of geopolitical danger as carte blanche to disregard contractual orders.
The eventual arbitration may therefore turn on contemporaneous intelligence reports, threat assessments, insurer communications, naval advisories, notices exchanged between owner and charterer and the evidence upon which the master’s judgment was actually based.
Companies operating in the region should consequently document their decisions contemporaneously rather than attempt to reconstruct their reasoning months later before an arbitral tribunal.
Insurance May Decide Whether the Voyage Exists at All
The insurance dimension has likewise moved from theoretical to immediate.
A ship can remain physically capable of sailing while becoming commercially incapable of sailing because suitable insurance is unavailable, prohibitively expensive or subject to exclusions that render the voyage unacceptable to owners, financiers or mortgagees.
BIMCO’s current CONWARTIME wording expressly recognises additional war-risk premiums and additional kidnap-and-ransom insurance costs as relevant “Insurance Costs”.
The Hormuz crisis consequently creates disputes not merely about whether insurance is obtainable, but about who must bear its additional cost.
That distinction can determine the profitability of an entire voyage.
The same applies to crew bonuses, security arrangements, naval escorts, deviation expenses, port-of-refuge costs and additional bunkers.
In a relatively peaceful market these clauses can appear boilerplate. In Hormuz they become the economic heart of the charterparty.
Sanctions and Maritime Security Are Now Intertwined
Another significant development is the convergence between military measures and economic sanctions.
Ships and operators must increasingly assess not merely whether a vessel can physically transit the Strait but whether dealing with a particular ship, port, counterparty, insurer, financial institution or cargo may generate sanctions exposure.
The position becomes especially difficult where one state blacklists vessels, another state sanctions the authority imposing that blacklist, naval forces control movement through particular waters and commercial parties remain contractually bound to perform.
The result is a form of legal crossfire.
A decision designed to comply with one regulatory system may simultaneously place a contracting party in breach of another contractual obligation.
This is precisely the environment in which sanctions warranties, compliance clauses, termination provisions and governing-law clauses cease being peripheral boilerplate.
Pakistan: The Hormuz Crisis Is Already a Domestic Energy-Law Problem
For Pakistan the consequences are particularly tangible.
Pakistan’s dependence upon Gulf energy means that Hormuz disruption does not remain a distant maritime-law problem. It passes through LNG procurement, petroleum pricing, foreign exchange management, electricity generation and ultimately the domestic economy.
There is already documentary evidence of the regulatory consequences.
On 23 April 2026, the State Bank of Pakistan amended foreign-exchange instructions specifically “in view of the ongoing geopolitical situation” in order to facilitate imports of crude oil, petroleum products and LNG. The measures included greater flexibility for financial instruments and standby letters of credit associated with such imports.
The physical supply problem was even more striking.
In April, three LNG cargoes intended for Pakistan reportedly turned back from Hormuz because of security concerns, forcing Pakistan LNG Limited back into the spot market. Pakistan subsequently accepted a cargo priced at approximately US$18.40 per mmBtu, illustrating how maritime insecurity can rapidly become an electricity-cost and balance-of-payments problem.
And the problem has not entirely disappeared with the passage of summer. On 7 September, Pakistan LNG Limited was reported to have reissued a tender for a September LNG cargo after earlier offers were rejected as too expensive, against the background of contracted supply disruption, RLNG shortages and power difficulties.
This creates obvious legal implications for Pakistani public-sector entities, importers, banks, power producers, petroleum companies and industrial consumers.
Future energy procurement documentation should be reviewed with particular attention to destination flexibility, substitute supply, price-adjustment mechanisms, sanctions events, force majeure thresholds, emergency procurement, ship-to-ship transfer arrangements, letters of credit, demurrage, war-risk premiums and the allocation of transport interruption risk.
A contract negotiated in Islamabad or Karachi can therefore acquire an unexpectedly maritime character once its performance depends upon a tanker successfully passing between Iran and Oman.
The Most Important Commercial Lesson From Hormuz
There is a broader lesson here which extends beyond the present conflict.
Commercial contracts are frequently negotiated during periods of normality but litigated during periods of abnormality.
The parties therefore tend to focus intensely upon price, quantity and delivery while treating clauses concerning war, sanctions, force majeure, insurance and alternative performance as remote legal housekeeping.
Hormuz demonstrates why that approach is dangerous.
When geopolitical conditions deteriorate, the supposedly secondary provisions become the contract.
The dispute is no longer over whether crude costs US$70 or US$75 per barrel. It becomes whether the seller had to deliver at all; whether the charterer could order the vessel through the Strait; whether the owner could refuse; whether another port had to be nominated; whether additional insurance was recoverable; whether a delay placed the vessel off-hire; whether a sanctions clause permitted termination; and whether an alternative cargo or route constituted legally adequate performance.
That is risk allocation in its purest form.
Why Much of the Hormuz War Will Ultimately Be Litigated in London
The concluding observation in our original article has become still more compelling.
The physical crisis is occurring around Iran, Oman and the Persian Gulf.
But a considerable proportion of the resulting private-law disputes are likely to be resolved under English law and through London maritime arbitration.
That is the curious geography of modern international commerce.
An attack may occur near Bandar Abbas. An LNG cargo may originate in Qatar. The buyer may be Pakistani, Indian, Chinese or European. The vessel may sail under the flag of yet another jurisdiction. The insurer may operate from London. The charterparty may contain English governing law and an LMAA arbitration clause.
The eventual legal battle can therefore take place thousands of kilometres from the missile, mine or blockade that caused it.
BIMCO’s August acknowledgment that the Gulf crisis has already generated questions concerning safe routes, deviation, off-hire, redelivery, force majeure, insurance and war-risk allocation suggests that this litigation and arbitration cycle has merely begun.
The Strait of Hormuz is consequently no longer simply one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.
In 2026 it has become something still more revealing: a live stress test of the legal architecture upon which global commerce depends.
And the ultimate question is no longer simply whether ships can get through.
It is who pays when they cannot.
Older Article Continues below:
In recent months, renewed geopolitical tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States have once again drawn the world’s attention to one of the most strategically sensitive maritime corridors on earth: the Strait of Hormuz. Approximately one-fifth of global oil supply transits this narrow channel linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. Any interruption of traffic through this route therefore reverberates instantly across global energy markets.
While geopolitical analysis tends to focus on military escalation and economic consequences, the legal ramifications of a disruption to the Strait of Hormuz are equally profound. Maritime chokepoints sit at the intersection of international law, private commercial agreements, and insurance regimes. When such a passage is threatened or closed, the consequences ripple through shipping contracts, energy supply agreements, insurance markets, and international dispute resolution mechanisms.
This article examines the principal legal consequences that may arise from a closure or disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, with particular attention to three interconnected legal spheres: public international law, private commercial law, and the global arbitration landscape governing maritime commerce.
The Legal Status of the Strait of Hormuz Under International Law
The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a geographic passage; it is a legally significant maritime strait governed by principles embedded in modern international law.
Under the framework of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, straits used for international navigation are subject to the regime of transit passage. This principle guarantees that vessels and aircraft of all nations enjoy the right to continuous and expeditious passage through such waterways.
In practical terms, this means that coastal states bordering the strait, most prominently Iran and Oman, may regulate aspects of navigation relating to safety or environmental protection but cannot suspend the right of transit passage altogether.
A deliberate closure of the strait would therefore raise serious questions under international law concerning:
- violation of freedom of navigation
• interference with international trade routes
• potential breaches of treaty obligations
• state responsibility for economic damage caused to third states.
Historically, disputes involving obstruction of international straits rarely reach formal adjudication before bodies such as the International Court of Justice, largely because geopolitical considerations tend to override judicial settlement. Nevertheless, the legal framework governing such straits remains well established.
Energy Security and the Fragility of Global Supply Chains
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz derives from the extraordinary concentration of energy flows passing through it.
Major energy exporters including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates rely heavily on maritime shipments through this corridor.
A disruption therefore produces several immediate economic effects:
- oil price volatility
• interruption of liquefied natural gas shipments
• increased shipping insurance premiums
• delays in global energy supply chains.
Such disruptions often trigger cascading contractual disputes across the global energy industry, particularly where supply contracts assume uninterrupted shipping routes.
Force Majeure and the Law of Energy Contracts
Long-term oil and gas supply agreements typically contain force majeure clauses addressing unforeseen events that render contractual performance impossible.
Military conflict, blockades, and maritime closure frequently fall within the scope of these clauses. However, the application of force majeure is rarely straightforward.
Under English commercial law, widely used in international energy contracts, parties invoking force majeure must demonstrate that the event has rendered contractual performance impossible rather than merely more expensive or inconvenient.
The distinction was famously articulated in the decision of Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH, where the closure of the Suez Canal did not excuse performance because alternative shipping routes remained available.
In a Hormuz crisis, similar arguments would likely arise. Buyers may argue that delivery obligations remain enforceable via alternative routes or substitute suppliers, while sellers may contend that shipping through the region has become commercially or physically impossible.
Such disputes frequently culminate in arbitration proceedings involving billions of dollars in contractual claims.
Charterparty Disputes and the Safe Port Doctrine
Another major category of litigation arising from maritime disruption concerns charterparty agreements, which govern the hiring of vessels for cargo transport.
Under established principles of maritime law, charterers are required to nominate ports that are “prospectively safe” for the vessel.
The leading authority on this doctrine remains The Eastern City, which held that a port is unsafe where a vessel cannot reach it without exposure to dangers that cannot be avoided by ordinary seamanship.
In the context of military hostilities near the Strait of Hormuz, shipowners may therefore refuse charterers’ orders to sail into the Gulf if credible risks exist from:
- missile attacks
• naval mines
• drone strikes
• armed vessel seizures.
Disputes concerning the safety of ports and navigation routes are commonly referred to maritime arbitration.
Insurance Law and War-Risk Coverage
Shipping through conflict zones raises complex insurance questions.
Marine insurance policies traditionally distinguish between:
- ordinary marine perils (covered under hull insurance)
• war risks (often excluded unless separately insured).
When vessels suffer damage from military activity, such as missile strikes or naval mines, insurers frequently contest whether the loss falls within covered risks.
The global marine insurance market is heavily centred in Lloyd’s of London, meaning that many such disputes ultimately appear before the Commercial Court of England and Wales or maritime arbitration panels in London.
Insurance disputes arising from attacks on shipping during the Iran–Iraq War provide numerous precedents illustrating how courts allocate liability between insurers and shipowners in wartime conditions.
Arbitration and the Global Maritime Legal System
A striking feature of maritime disputes arising from Gulf crises is that the legal battles rarely occur in the Gulf itself.
Instead, they typically unfold before international arbitration institutions, particularly the London Maritime Arbitrators Association.
This phenomenon reflects the dominance of English law in maritime commerce. Standard shipping contracts and charterparty forms widely adopt English governing law and London arbitration clauses.
Consequently, a dispute involving a tanker owned by a Greek company, chartered by a Singaporean trader, carrying Gulf oil to China may ultimately be resolved by arbitrators sitting in London.
This institutional framework ensures predictability and neutrality in resolving disputes arising from volatile geopolitical circumstances.
Investment Law and State Responsibility
A prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz may also generate claims under international investment law.
Foreign investors operating refineries, pipelines, shipping terminals, or energy infrastructure in the region may seek compensation where government measures taken during a crisis adversely affect their investments.
Such claims are frequently pursued through arbitration under bilateral investment treaties before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.
Investor-state arbitration has increasingly become a forum for disputes involving energy regulation and emergency economic measures.
Implications for Energy Importing States
Countries heavily dependent on imported oil, particularly China, India, and Japan, face acute economic exposure in the event of Hormuz disruption.
Beyond immediate energy shortages, governments may adopt emergency regulatory measures including:
- price controls
• fuel rationing
• release of strategic petroleum reserves
• temporary export restrictions.
Such interventions may themselves trigger legal disputes with private sector actors affected by regulatory intervention.
Pakistan-Specific Legal Implications of a Strait of Hormuz Disruption
While much of the global commentary on the Strait of Hormuz crisis focuses on major powers such as the United States, China, and India, the legal and economic consequences for Pakistan are particularly significant due to the country’s heavy reliance on Gulf energy imports and maritime trade routes.
From a legal and regulatory standpoint, several consequences could arise.
First, Pakistan’s energy import contracts would immediately come under pressure. The majority of Pakistan’s crude oil and LNG imports originate from Gulf producers including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Disruption of maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would affect long-term supply contracts executed by Pakistani state entities and energy companies.
Such agreements frequently contain force majeure provisions, permitting temporary suspension of obligations where performance becomes impossible due to war, blockade, or navigational hazards. If shipments cannot physically leave Gulf ports or if tanker insurance becomes unavailable, suppliers may invoke force majeure, potentially triggering supply interruptions to Pakistan’s domestic energy market.
Secondly, Pakistan may be required to rely more heavily on government emergency regulatory powers. Under Pakistan’s statutory framework governing petroleum supply and energy security, the federal government may impose emergency measures including:
- fuel rationing
• price regulation
• prioritisation of essential industries
• release of strategic fuel reserves.
While such measures are designed to protect national energy security, they may also give rise to disputes with private importers or energy distributors whose contractual rights are affected by government intervention.
Thirdly, Pakistan’s balance-of-payments obligations would face renewed strain. Oil price spikes triggered by disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could significantly increase Pakistan’s import bill. This, in turn, may require additional negotiations with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, particularly where external financing programmes depend upon stable macroeconomic indicators.
Fourthly, Pakistani shipping, logistics, and insurance sectors may encounter contractual disputes relating to delayed cargoes, cancelled shipments, or sharply increased war-risk insurance premiums. Such disputes may involve Pakistani companies but are likely to be adjudicated through international arbitration mechanisms, especially those applying English maritime law.
Finally, Pakistan’s strategic position as a regional logistics hub, particularly through infrastructure projects linked to the Gwadar Port and broader regional connectivity initiatives, may acquire increased significance if alternative shipping routes are sought to bypass Gulf instability.
Thus, while Pakistan is not a direct participant in the geopolitical conflict surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, the legal, economic, and regulatory consequences for the country could be substantial.
Conclusion
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most strategically sensitive chokepoints in the global economy. Any disruption to navigation through this corridor reverberates far beyond the waters of the Persian Gulf.
While geopolitical analysts tend to focus on military escalation and oil prices, the legal consequences are equally significant. Maritime contracts, insurance policies, energy supply agreements, and international investment protections all intersect in this complex legal environment.
For commercial actors engaged in the global energy trade, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not merely represent a geopolitical crisis. It would trigger a vast network of legal disputes spanning maritime arbitration, international law, insurance litigation, and contractual interpretation.
In this sense, the Strait of Hormuz functions not only as a strategic chokepoint in global energy markets but also as a central node in the legal architecture of international commerce.
Timeline of Major Strait of Hormuz Crises (1980–2026)
The strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz has been demonstrated repeatedly over the past four decades. Each crisis has tested the resilience of international maritime law, commercial shipping practices, and global energy markets.
1980–1988 , The Tanker War during the Iran–Iraq Conflict
During the Iran–Iraq War, both sides targeted oil tankers and merchant vessels in the Persian Gulf. Hundreds of ships were damaged or destroyed, leading to a surge in maritime insurance litigation and disputes concerning war-risk coverage. The conflict produced numerous precedents in maritime arbitration relating to charterparty obligations and safe-port warranties.
1987–1988 , Operation Earnest Will
In response to attacks on shipping, the United States launched naval escort operations to protect oil tankers travelling through the Gulf. This marked one of the largest naval convoy operations since the Second World War and reinforced the principle of freedom of navigation through international straits.
2011–2012 , Iranian Threats to Close the Strait
Amid escalating sanctions against Iran, Iranian officials threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. Although the threat was never implemented, oil markets reacted immediately with significant price volatility, demonstrating the extraordinary sensitivity of global energy markets to even hypothetical disruption.
2019 , Tanker Seizures and Attacks
A series of tanker seizures and suspected mine attacks occurred in the Gulf amid tensions between Iran and Western states. These incidents triggered renewed concerns regarding maritime security and resulted in increased war-risk insurance premiums for vessels entering the region.
2026 , Escalation of Regional Conflict
The latest crisis, involving escalating hostilities between Iran, Israel, and the United States, has again raised the possibility of disruption to Hormuz shipping. Even partial disruption has already produced oil price spikes, shipping delays, and renewed debate regarding the legal consequences of maritime chokepoint instability.
Mapping the Legal Battleground: Where Disputes Are Likely to Be Decided
One of the most striking features of maritime crises is that the resulting legal disputes rarely occur where the crisis itself takes place. Instead, they are typically resolved in international arbitration centres and specialised commercial courts.
The likely jurisdictional landscape can be summarised as follows.
Maritime Charterparty Disputes
Voyage refusals, safe-port disputes, and charterparty breaches are most commonly referred to arbitration before the London Maritime Arbitrators Association, reflecting the widespread use of English law in shipping contracts.
Commercial Contract and Commodity Trading Disputes
Oil and LNG trading contracts frequently contain arbitration clauses referring disputes to institutions such as the London Court of International Arbitration or the International Chamber of Commerce.
Marine Insurance Litigation
Insurance disputes concerning tanker damage, cargo loss, or war-risk exclusions are often heard in the Commercial Court of England and Wales due to the concentration of global marine insurance markets in Lloyd’s of London.
Investment Treaty Arbitration
Foreign investors affected by government emergency measures may bring claims before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes under bilateral investment treaties.
Public International Law Disputes
In theory, disputes concerning unlawful obstruction of an international strait could be brought before the International Court of Justice, although geopolitical considerations often prevent such litigation.
This jurisdictional structure illustrates how a maritime crisis in the Gulf ultimately reverberates across a global network of legal institutions, particularly those centred in London.
The Next Wave of Legal Disputes if the Crisis Escalates
If disruption to the Strait of Hormuz continues or intensifies, a predictable sequence of legal disputes is likely to unfold across multiple sectors.
The first wave would consist of maritime disputes involving charterers ordering vessels into potentially unsafe waters. Shipowners may refuse such orders, triggering arbitration over safe-port obligations and deviation clauses.
The second wave would involve insurance claims arising from vessel damage or cargo loss caused by military activity. Insurers may seek to rely on war-risk exclusions, while shipowners argue that coverage applies.
The third wave would emerge within energy trading markets. Commodity traders unable to deliver oil or LNG cargoes may invoke force majeure provisions, leading to high-value arbitration proceedings.
The fourth wave could involve regulatory intervention by governments seeking to stabilise domestic energy markets through price controls, export restrictions, or emergency procurement measures. Such actions may generate disputes with private sector actors affected by regulatory intervention.
Finally, a prolonged crisis could produce investment treaty arbitration, where foreign investors claim compensation for losses resulting from government actions taken during the emergency.
Taken together, these disputes could involve billions of dollars and persist for many years after the geopolitical crisis itself has subsided.
Conclusion: The Strait of Hormuz as Both Geopolitical and Legal Chokepoint
The Strait of Hormuz occupies a unique position in the architecture of global commerce. It is simultaneously a strategic maritime chokepoint, a critical energy corridor, and a focal point of international legal complexity.
When tensions escalate in this narrow passage between the Persian Gulf and the wider ocean, the consequences extend far beyond oil markets and naval deployments. Maritime contracts, insurance policies, energy supply agreements, and investment treaties all converge in a complex web of legal relationships that determine how risk is allocated when global trade routes are threatened.
For commercial actors, energy traders, shipping companies, and investors, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would therefore represent not only a geopolitical crisis but also the beginning of one of the most complex waves of international commercial litigation imaginable.
In that sense, the Strait of Hormuz is not merely a passage through which oil flows. It is also a corridor through which the legal principles governing global trade are constantly tested.
One Final Observation
Why the World’s Oil War Will Be Litigated in London Courts!
Curiously, the epicentre of that legal struggle is unlikely to be in the Gulf region itself. Instead, the majority of disputes arising from any prolonged disruption to the Strait of Hormuz would almost certainly be resolved thousands of miles away in London.
This phenomenon is not accidental but rather the product of the historical architecture of global shipping law.
The dominance of English law in maritime commerce
International shipping contracts, particularly charterparties governing tanker transport, are overwhelmingly governed by English law. This is the result of centuries of commercial practice centred on London as the historical hub of maritime finance and insurance.
Even where neither contracting party is British, charterparty agreements commonly stipulate that disputes will be resolved under English law and referred to arbitration in London.
The result is that when crises affect maritime navigation, disputes between shipowners, charterers, insurers, and cargo owners frequently converge in London arbitration forums such as the London Maritime Arbitrators Association.
In practical terms, this means that a dispute between a Greek tanker owner, a Singaporean charterer, and a Middle Eastern oil trader may still be resolved in London.
Charterparty disputes and the “safe port” doctrine
One of the most immediate legal consequences of a Strait of Hormuz disruption would be disputes concerning charterparty obligations.
Charterers typically instruct vessels where to load and discharge cargo. However, they must comply with the fundamental contractual obligation to nominate a “safe port.”
Where military conflict renders a port or navigational route unsafe, shipowners may lawfully refuse the voyage.
The leading authority on this issue remains The Eastern City, which established that a port is unsafe where a vessel cannot reach it without exposure to dangers that cannot be avoided by ordinary seamanship.
A Hormuz crisis would therefore generate numerous disputes addressing questions such as:
- whether the Persian Gulf remained a “prospectively safe” destination
• whether charterers breached their safe-port obligations
• whether shipowners were entitled to deviate from voyage orders.
Force majeure and frustration of oil supply contracts
Energy markets would simultaneously face widespread contractual disputes.
Long-term oil and LNG supply agreements frequently include force majeure clauses, allowing parties to suspend obligations where performance becomes impossible due to war, blockade, or government action.
However, English courts interpret such clauses narrowly.
The seminal authority of Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd v Noblee Thorl GmbH established that a contract is not frustrated merely because performance becomes more expensive or inconvenient. The doctrine of frustration applies only where the contractual obligation becomes fundamentally different from what the parties contemplated.
Thus, if tankers could theoretically still reach markets by longer routes or alternative ports, courts might conclude that contractual obligations remain enforceable.
This legal nuance would likely become central to disputes arising from the present geopolitical crisis.
Marine insurance and war-risk litigation
London’s prominence in Hormuz litigation is further reinforced by the structure of the global insurance market.
The world’s largest marine insurance and reinsurance markets remain concentrated in London, particularly within the Lloyd’s of London.
When tankers are damaged by missile strikes, naval mines, or drone attacks, insurers must determine whether the losses fall within:
- ordinary marine perils
• excluded war risks
• specialised war-risk insurance cover.
These determinations frequently produce complex litigation in the Commercial Court of England and Wales.
Historically, similar disputes arose during the Tanker War phase of the Iran–Iraq War, when attacks on shipping generated extensive insurance litigation.
Commodity trading disputes and arbitration
The ripple effects of a Hormuz closure extend beyond shipping into global commodities markets.
Oil traders frequently rely on arbitration clauses referring disputes to the London Court of International Arbitration or the International Chamber of Commerce.
Where shipments fail to arrive, buyers may allege breach of contract while sellers invoke force majeure.
Such disputes can involve billions of dollars and frequently take years to resolve.
Why London, not the Gulf?
One might reasonably ask why disputes arising from a Gulf crisis are not litigated in Gulf jurisdictions.
The answer lies in three interlocking factors:
First, international shipping companies and commodity traders prefer the predictability and neutrality of English commercial law.
Secondly, London possesses centuries of maritime jurisprudence and specialised judges familiar with complex shipping disputes.
Thirdly, the global shipping industry has long standardised its contractual documentation, such as BIMCO charter-party forms, around English law.
As a result, even conflicts occurring in Middle Eastern waters often culminate in legal proceedings conducted in London courtrooms and arbitration chambers.
A maritime crisis that becomes a legal crisis
The lesson from previous maritime conflicts is clear: the economic disruption of a chokepoint such as the Strait of Hormuz inevitably generates waves of commercial litigation.
- Shipping companies dispute voyage orders.
- Insurers contest coverage.
- Commodity traders argue over force majeure.
- Governments impose emergency energy regulations.
Each dispute reflects a deeper tension between geopolitical instability and the legal frameworks governing global commerce.