Argument that caretaker Prime Minister could not advise President fur promulgation of Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996–Power of care-taker Prime Minister are not restricted or curbed in any manner, therefore, if he advised, President as per demand of nation then there was legally nothing wrong with some. PLJ 1997 Cr. C. (Lahore) 1049
Preamble– Contention that Ordinance (XI of being a temporary legislation proceeding initiated thereunder could not survive on its repeal–Reliance was placed on Article 89 and 73(2) of Constitution of Pakistan 1973–Held : Ordinance (XI promulgated on 18.11.1996 was a temporary piece of legislation which would have expired in terms of Article 89(2) of Constitution on 17.3.1997 Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897), Ss. 6 & 24–Ordinance (XVI of 1996) was still in force when same was repealed by Ordinance (XX of 1997) which was a verbatim reproduction of Ordinance (XVI of 1996) and Ordinance (XX of 1997), was finally converted into a permanent legislation when legislature passed Ehtesab Act., 1997–Effect–If an Ordinance stands repealed under Constitution, consequences of repeal are provided under Article 264 of Constitution–However, if a law is repealed by a subsequent Act, consequences flowing from such repeal are to be determined with reference to provisions of Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897–Contention was that Ordinance XX of 1997 while repealing Ordinance CXI of 1996, though contained a saving clause, did not provide for continuation of proceedings pending under Ordinance CXI of 1996, which showed that legislature did not intend to keep pending proceedings alive under Ordinance XX of 1997–Repeal of Ordinance CXI of 1996, by Ordinance XX of 1997 was not a case of simple repeal but it was a case of simultaneous repeal and re-enactment of a legislation, and therefore, Section 6 and Section 24 of General Clauses Act were also attracted–Ordinance XX of 1997 was a verbatim reproduction of Ordinance CXI of 1996–Ordinance CXI of 1996 was still enforced when it was repealed by Ordinance XX of 1997–Ordinance XX of 1997 was finally converted into a permanent legislation when Legislature passed it as Act IX of 1997–It is therefore, quite clear that though Ordinance CXI of 1996 was a temporary legislation but Legislature intended to provide continuity to its provisions by first repealing it by Ordinance XX and then converting later into an Act of Legislature by passing it as Act IX of 1997–There was a clear intention on part of Legislature while promulgating Ordinance XX of 1997 to provide continuity to provisions of Ordinance CXI of 1996–Therefore, in spite of fact that Section 28 of Ordinance XX of 1997 did not specifically save proceedings instituted under Ordinance CXI of 1996 there was clear intention on part of Legislature to keep proceedings instituted under Ordinance CXI of 1996 alive under Ordinance XX of 1997. PLJ 2000 SC 741
S. 13(i) &4(4)(5)–Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 and sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 14 of Ehtesab Ordinance are directory in native and not mandatory. PLJ 1997 Cr. C. (Lahore) 1049
Ss. 2(f) & 3 read with S. 265-K of Cr.P.C. and Rules of Business (Sindh), para. 76W–Reference against accused by Chief Ehtesab Commissioner–Allegation that accused as Chief Minister (as per terms of Reference) had prevailed upon Chairman and Members of District Council to arrange and execute schemes of face lifting of his personal family farm–Evidence produced by prosecution clearly showed that road in question which was electrified was public road which was used by public at large and that same was not in the exclusive use of accused and his family–Witnesses examined by prosecution had not in any way implicated accused–Resolution for electrification of road and area in question, was tabled by Chairman, District Council which was carried out unanimously–Area which was electrified was not only farm of accused/respondent but whole village was electrified–Prosecution’s plea that accused had prevailed upon District Council and concerned Department to carry out such project was not borne out from evidence on record–Order passed by Chief Minister for sanctioning of funds for project in question would be deemed to be the order of Government as per Rules of Business–Prosecution had failed to implicate Chief Minister for misuse of funds–Case against Chief Minister was, thus, fully covered by provisions of S. 265-K, Cr.P.C.—Facts, circumstances and evidence did not constitute offence in terms of S. 3, Ehtesab Ordinance, 1996 to have been committed by accused and there was no probability or possibility of accused being convicted for the acts, omissions and commissions of corruption and corrupt practices on this account–Accused acquitted. PLJ 1998 Karachi 54